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INTRODUCTION

If Web 1.0 was about access to information via the Internet and Web
2.0 was about the formation of the online marketplace, Web 3.0 is about
the platform: the transformation of the offline marketplace, particularly the
service industry, by online transactions.' The application of algorithmic
tools to the economies of leisure, consumption, services, and
manufacturing has produced a profound transformation of the service
economy.2 Even more, the movement of many of these services to cloud
providers has an even greater, transnational character. This move
facilitates the development of a global infrastructure; as two commentators
observe, the emergence of platform and cloud architecture "reconfigure
1. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MiNN. L. REv. 87, 94 (2016).
2. See generally Martin Kenney & John Zysman. The Rise of the Platform
Economy, 32 ISSUES IN SCi. & TECH. 61 (2016) (citing work by Stuart Feldman, Kenji
Kushida, Jonathan Murray, and others discussing this transformation).
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globalization itself." 3
At the same time, the definitional and regulatory complexities that
accompany the emergence of platforms have posed some significant
challenges for lawyers and commentators. At its simplest, a platform
"points to a set of online digital arrangements whose algorithms serve to
organize and structure economic and social activity." 4 This not only
produces - and is facilitated by - a system of shared tools, technologies
and interfaces enabling decentralized innovation, but also creates a hybrid
blend of market and social interactions that we have not yet seen before in
the digital economy.'
Yet in order to explore the legal complexities that platforms create, we
must also analyze some of the differences between them. Platforms can be
characterized by the particular services that they offer or the business
models that they disrupt. 6 Some of these platforms, like Google and
Facebook, offer communication tools, social media, and information;
others, like Etsy, eBay, and Amazon operate as online marketplaces; while
still others provide infrastructure and tools to build more platforms, like
Amazon Web Services.' One could characterize platforms based on labormarket arrangements, like crowdsourcing (Amazon Mechanical Turk, as
an example) and on-demand services (Uber, TaskRabbit and others).
Some platforms facilitate entrepreneurship, and others have more
hierarchical arrangements that rely on contractor-like arrangements. 9
As Orly Lobel and others have explained, while the label of a
"platform" is intentionally broad, it represents a myriad of new business
models that disrupt previous economies of production, consumption,
finance, knowledge and education, among other elements.1 0 If traditional

3. Id. at 61.
4. Id. at 65. For more on the definition and attributes of platforms, see Diane
Coyle, Making the Most of Platforms: a Policy Research Agenda, (The Jean-Jacques
Laffont Digital Chair, Working Paper), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract id=2857188.
5. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2 at 67.
6. See ARUN SuNDARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT
AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 77 (2016).
7. Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2, at 61.
8. Ruth Berins Collier et al., The Regulation of Labor Platforms: The Politics of
the
Uber
Economy
7
(Mar.
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.brie.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Reg-of-Labor-Platforms.pdf.
9. Sundarajan, supra note 6, at 77-79.
10. See Lobel, supranote 1, at 98-99.
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categories of business relied on the consistency of dyads like
employer/employee, seller/buyer, and producer/consumer, platform
entrepreneurship exploits networks where these lines become blurred
through sharing and pooling economies." By lowering transaction costs
through connecting consumers directly with producers, platform
economies promise less waste, and a greater ability to break both supply
and demand into what Lobel describes as discrete, modular units - short
term housing assistance and help with minor tasks such as furniture
installation, cooking, driving, and the like." "Web 3.0," Lobel argues, "is
transforming the lifestyle of the masses, not only better matching a static
equilibrium of supply and demand, but also generating different sets of
supply and demand and reconfiguring markets." 3
The benefits of a platform economy are manifold. The trend toward
modularity (which Yochai Benkler describes as "granularity") transforms
ordinary exchanges into opportunities for market-based capitalism,
reducing barriers to entry, increasing dynamism and precision in pricing
and services.1 4 Platforms can reduce overall prices for consumers because
of the lowered transaction and overhead costs they are associated with by
connecting consumers with producers more directly and in real-time.' 5
They enable entities to take advantage of underutilized assets, like space,
and provide access to services that may have previously been
unavailable.1 6 They can improve the consumer experience by offering new
services that others have failed to offer.' 7 Finally, they can utilize systems
to track ratings and reputation, thereby ensuring trust between the
consumer and the service provider. 8 Collectively, platforms also
underscore a significant shift from theories of ownership and property; the
"consumption culture" that we inhabit becomes replaced with a focus on
access instead.' 9 "Owning a car," Lobel writes, "is not as important as the
ability to use one when needed." 2 0

11. Id. at 100-01.
12. Id. at 109-10.
13. Id. at 114.
14. Id. at 109.
15. Rudy Telles Jr., Digital Matching Firms: A New Definition in the 'Sharing
Economy'Space, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., at 11.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id.
19. Lobel, supra note 1, at 110.
20. Id. at 110.
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Yet these new economies usher in complex questions of both
definition and regulation. Within this spectrum of views, some have
expressed fear that the platform economy facilitates the avoidance of
welfare-enhancing laws like long-term employment contracts, insurance,
and quality control regulations. 2 1 As Lobel argues,
Proponents romantically envision the platform as a return to the
days free from corporate dominance, when interactions happened
directly and intimately between individuals, when design was
bottom-up and relationships were based on community rather
than markets. For opponents, it is a dystopian uber-capitalist
development in which every interaction becomes the basis of
market exchanges, privacy and leisure are lost, and Silicon
Valley style-libertarians become richer at the expense of
everyone else.22

-

Central to these questions remains the ubiquity of the brand enterprise,
which affects nearly every layer of platform architecture. Trademarks are
central to the success of the platform economy, but few commentators
have really delved into the question of how trademark law both governs
and is governed by - the emergence of these new economies. Thus, this
Article lays out a spectrum of trademark interactivity, identifying the
emergence of two central forms of platform entrepreneurship, and then
analyzes how the design and architecture of these new forms ushers in
new challenges and opportunities for the modernization of trademark law
altogether.
Trademark law plays a central, determinative role in the success or
failure of the platform enterprise. At the broadest level, in Part II, this
Article argues that the platform economy facilitates the emergence of what
is called "macrobrands" - the rise of platform economies whose sole
source of capital inheres in the value of the brand itself - the Airbnbs,
Ubers, and eBays of the world.2 3 At the narrowest level, Part III argues

21. Id. at 130-37. See also Nathan Heller, Is the Gig Economy Working?, NEW
YORKER, May 15, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/is-the-gigeconomy-working; Collier et al., supra note 8.
22. Lobel, supra note 1, at 105.
23. Others, too, have used the macro and micro brand terminology to describe
similar patterns of user engagement and marketing, albeit in a non-platform context. See,
e.g., JOSE MARTI ET AL., Brand Engagement, in TIfE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE

FUTURE OF MARKETING 253 (Luiz Moutinho et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the role of
each structure in reaching consumers); T. Scott Gross, MICROBRANDING: BUILD A
POWERFUL PERSONAL BRAND & BEAT YOUR COMPETITION (2002) (discussing ways to

build a personal or local brand).
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that the platform economy, with its empowerment of the individual, has
also facilitated a parallel emergence of the "microbrand" - the rise of
discrete, small enterprises made up of individual businesses, each of
whom have a strong interest in utilizing the basic principles of branding
and trademark protection.
Indeed, this Article views the platform economy as a central
opportunity to modernize existing trademark law to accord with the
challenges of these new business models. As shown in Part II and Part III,
the interaction between macrobrands and microbrands challenges
trademark law to evolve to address the new issues presented by platform
economies. At the same time, however, our existing frameworks are
capacious enough to meet the challenges platforms pose, underscoring the
wisdom of the basic, bedrock trademark principles in the process. In Part
IV, we outline a host of suggestions to modernize, rather than displace,
trademark law for the digital economy. While change can occur by
legislation or voluntary measures, this Article focuses specifically on the
formation of statutory safe harbors and the modification of the standards
for infringement in common law. As this Article shows, these changes can
both protect and encourage the vibrancy of the platform economy in an
age of legal uncertainty.
II.

PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE AND THE RISE OF THE
MACROBRAND

As Julie Cohen has argued, the emergence of the platform economy is
deeply intertwined with the rise of informational capitalism. 2 4 Digital
platforms have resulted from the intersection of three recent economic
developments: the first involving the propertization of intangible
resources, the second involving the dematerialization of industrial
production, and the third involving the integration of systems of barter and
exchange within information platforms. 25 As she observes, platforms do
not "enter" or "expand" markets; instead, they replace them by
rematerializing them with new forms of transactional possibility. 2 6

24. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 132, 135
(framing the rise of informational capitalism that parallels the rise of industrial
capitalism) [hereinafter Cohen, Platform Economy]; see also JULIE E. COHEN, Between
Truth and Power, in INFORMATION, FREEDOM AND PROPERTY THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 57 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Bibi van den Berg
eds., 2016).

&

25 Cohen, Platform Economy, supra note 24 at 132.
26. Id.; See also Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12 NEW MEDIA
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platforms as "multi-sided

platforms" where two or more sides engage in commercial transactions,
such as Airbnb, eBay, Uber, Xbox, etc. 2 7 Many of these companies utilize
a model where independent contractors, rather than hired employees,
deliver requested services to the client. 2 8 Further, multi-sided platforms
can be characterized by two additional elements: (1) "they enable direct
interactions between two or more distinct sides," each of whom retain
some control over the key terms of the transaction, such as the terms and
conditions of the purchase; and (2) "each side is affiliated with the
[existing] platform," meaning that both sides make platform-specific
investments that enable them to communicate directly with one another. 2 9
Take, for example, Airbnb. Instead of directly providing short-term
lodging to its customers, Airbnb facilitates transactions between those
seeking such lodging, and those offering the lodging. The parties offering
the lodging are not employees of Airbnb, but they are affiliated with
Airbnb as "hosts." The parties seeking the lodging are also affiliated with
Airbnb as "guests."
Today, platforms like Uber and Airbnb, while remaining part and
parcel of the sharing economy, also retain a significant degree of control
over their hosting activities.3 0 Indeed, some commentators have argued
that these platforms rest on an arbitrage between the regulation of
established businesses, which are held to regulatory standards regarding
the treatment of workers, consumers, customers, and markets, and the
comparably greyer areas of platform regulation in addressing these
entities. 3 1 "In the current manifestation," commentators argue, "the
platform operator has unprecedented control over the compensation for
and organization of work, while still claiming to be only an
intermediary." 32 Because of the regulatory absence in these arenas,
platforms have been able to gain an unprecedented degree of power, a
power that some have argued may be even more formidable than early

Soc'y 347

(2010)

(further

discussion of platforms); Nick

Srnicek,

PLATFORM

CAPITALISM (2017).

27. Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Multi-sided platforms, 34 INT'L J. OF INDUS.
ORG. 162, 162 (2015).

28. Id.
29. Id. at 163.
30. Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2, at 62.

31. Id.
32. Id.
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factories in the Industrial Revolution.3 3 The absence of regulatory reach,
coupled with the nimble path of innovation in the platform economy, has a
profound effect on the reorganization of society, markets, and firms; as
some have observed, "[w]hatever we call the transformation, the
consequences are dramatic." 34
Network effects are central to the success of the platform enterprise,
because they demonstrate that the more users subscribe to a platform, the
more that platform increases in value. 35 As a product increases in
popularity, it increases in dominance, risking the increase in barriers to
entry for external entities. 3 6 An additional network effect is also created by
"learning-by-doing," leading users to prefer using the same platform
because of its success in both learning the consumer's preferences, and
from the consumer's own preferences in relying on the same tool of
information. 37 As more and more users are drawn to the platform, it
increases in its efficiency, because it is more able to process requests
efficiently based on the success of its algorithms in using - and acquiring-larger and larger quantities of data. 3 8
While these effects are often positive for the everyday user, they may
also be detrimental from the perspective of other market entrants. This is
because platforms can take on gatekeeping functions that can exclude
forms of competition, like blocking offerings from outside sellers, or by
recommending only applications and sites that exist within its
ecosystem. 3 9 As a result, platforms can exclude others from markets by
regulating what is and is not available, thereby distorting the reality of
what the marketplace offers to the consumer. 4 0
While much ink has been spilled in analyzing and discussing the
overall effect of platform arrangements on the labor economy and civil

33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our
Economy, Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, at 1244, n.26
(forthcoming 2017) (quoting Margrethe Vestager, How competition supports innovation,
speech at Regulation4lnnovation conference, at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/how-competition-supportsinnovationen (May 24, 2016)).

36. Id. at 7.
37. Id at 7-8.
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 22.
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rights protections, fewer pieces have addressed the central role of
trademark law in the platform enterprise. Yet trademark and branding
practices are implicated within nearly every element of platform
architecture and entrepreneurship, raising central questions for the role of
regulation. Consider an example. Parking Panda is a platform that enables
users to find and secure parking spots. 4 1 The term "Parking Panda" itself
functions as both a trademark and a brand (we will explain the difference
between the two below).4 2 Yet given its existence as part of the platform
ecosystem, Parking Panda itself does not own the garages or the parking
spaces it advertises on its platform; rather, these are owned mainly by
individual parking companies. These companies have their own
trademarks, such as "Icon Parking" or "ABM Parking Services," two large
parking companies based in New York City. 4 3
In the platform enterprise, trademarks function just like other
trademarks in the sense that they serve informational and economic
functions.4 4 By enabling consumers to trust that their experience of a
certain product can be consistently associated with a particular trademark,
trademarks lower consumer search costs. 4 5 Yet trademarks play an even
more central role in platform entrepreneurship because they enable
consumers to identify clusters of marks with a particular platform, thereby
facilitating the reduction of transaction costs that are essential to a
platform's success. For example, with the Parking Panda platform, both
sets of marks, the Parking Panda's and the parking companies', inform
consumers that their parking experience will be similar to their previous
experiences, thereby enabling purchasers to rely on their previous
decisions.

41. See PARKING PANDA, How It Works, https://www.parkingpanda.com/how-itworks (last visited Jun. 29, 2017) (allowing advance parking reservation from computers
or in real-time from mobile phones).
42. U.S. TRADEMARK No. 4295552 (registered mark for "Parking Panda," operating
an online marketplace that allows drivers to find and rent parking spaces and users to rent
out their parking spaces."); See PARKING PANDA, The Year of Parking Panda A 2016
Edition, https://www.parkingpanda.com/year-in-review (last visited Jun. 29, 2017).
43. See PARKING PANDA, Search for Parking in New York City (last visited Jun. 29,
2017) (images on file with authors).
44. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 369 (1987) (A trademark conveys information that
allows the consumer to say to himself, "I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I
am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.").
45. Id.
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Branding, too, is an essential aspect of this enterprise. 4 6 Brands, on one
hand, incorporate a business's trademark, but instead of being primarily
informational in nature, they also convey an experience to the consumer.
Particularly in a platform ecosystem, brands tell the consumer about the
other individuals who buy the product, thereby creating a community of
likeminded purchasers.4 7 For example, although Parking Panda aims to
help users "find and reserve parking," the company describes its mission
as much more than just parking assistance:
"[t]hrough Parking Panda, drivers plan and commute smarter by
booking guaranteed parking in advance. Parking Panda
customers are empowered with the ability to search and compare
thousands of parking options and prices in more than 40 cities
throughout North America." 48
Through this statement, Parking Panda attempts to create a community
of "smart commuters,"4 a consumer identity and experience, which is
their "brand," while also having their related trademark, "Parking Panda."
As this Article has suggested, the "macrobrand" in this example is
"Parking Panda," and the "microbrands" comprise the individual parking
companies that operate within the Parking Panda ecosystem. Yet the legal

46. See Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 985
(2012) ("The corporate dimension of branding creates a strategic asset that allows a
corporation to forge not only a product symbol, but also a connection with consumers so
that consumers look beyond price when they make a purchasing decision."); Sonia K.
Katyal, Trademark Cosmopolitanism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 890 (2014) ("the
trademark represents both a global visual receptacle and a vehicle for all of the emotive
and personality characteristics that advertisers hope to associate with a particular
brand."); Irina D. Manta, Branded, 69 SMU L. REV. 713, 734 (2016) ("Brands, and
trademarks as part of them, lead consumers to purchase products that have been designed
and marketed to invoke experiences and feelings in the minds of the consumers that
influence what products they buy and how they experience the products. Consumers send
messages about themselves through the medium of trademarks and seek social status
through the same.").
47. See Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 95 (2010) (discussing
the consumer communities of brands such as Apple, Saab, Bronco, and HarleyDavidson); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media Amplify Consumer Investment in
Trademarks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1491, 1495 (2012) ("consumers continue to serve as nodes
in the social network, building ties with each other and the brand owner by contributing
stories to the brand narrative.").
48. See PARKING PANDA, About Us, https://www.parkingpanda.com/company (last
visited Jun. 29, 2017) (exulting the company's goals in lofty language typically
associated with a nonprofit).
4 9. Id.
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protection of trademarks, and by extension, brands, introduces tension into
the relationship between macro- and micro-brands. Trademark law
encourages owners to provide a consistent level of quality in their
products, to ensure consumer confidence and repeat purchases.o This is
done through granting trademark owners limited exclusivity in their
trademarks; for example, only one company can be known as "Parking
Panda" for online parking services. In addition, trademark law rewards
those owners that are active in policing their marks by granting them
"strong" or even "famous" status.' Therefore, trademark owners are
incentivized to police their marks against not just competitive
infringement by others who might "pass off' their goods as those of
another producer, but also against related or associative uses. 52 This has
led, in some cases, to trademark over-enforcement, particularly in
situations where macrobrands receive takedown requests to remove
allegedly infringing material that microbrands host on the platform. 5 3
Unfortunately, the doctrines governing trademarks and intermediary
liability are both confusing and outdated, particularly as applied to
platforms. This next subsection shows how this standard has played out in
both the real space and online context to demonstrate the particular
complexities platforms face. Special attention, too, is placed on alternative
standards of contributory liability, specifically emerging from Europe and
Canada, which have taken different approaches. Finally, we compare the
existing approach in trademark law with that taken in the copyright
context, which will lay the foundation for suggestions to reform existing
law.

A.

CONTRBUTORY LIABILITY: INWOOD AND BEYOND

The dominant test of contributory liability in the platform economy is
derived from the Supreme Court case of Inwood Laboratories v. Ives
Laboratories.5 4 This case addressed the question of whether manufacturers
of generic drugs should be held liable for pharmacies that packaged and
sold drugs under infringing packaging labels.5 5 The Supreme Court held
that a manufacturer and/or distributor could only be held liable for

50. See Jordan Teague, Promoting Trademark's Ends and Means through Online
ContributoryLiability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 461, 465 (2012).

5 1. Id.
52. Id
53. Id. at 476.
54. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).

55. Id. at 846.
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contributory infringement if it could be shown that they "intentionally
induce[d] another to infringe a trademark, or if it continue[d] to supply its
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement. ."5
Later cases have refined this standard to
provide that a defendant who takes a "willfully blind" approach (meaning
that an actor "suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate") can
rise to the level of contributory infringement.5 But both elements
suspicion and failure to investigate - need to be present, because courts
have held that simply failing to take precautions to limit counterfeiting, for
example, does not qualify as "willful blindness.""
The Inwood test has served as the touchstone for contributory liability
in both real and digital worlds. In Hard Rock Cafd Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit found that the operator of a
flea market could be held secondarily liable for a vendor who sold
infringing T-shirts, reasoning that the landlord-tenant relationship carried
with it special responsibilities to prevent infringement. 5 9 The Ninth
Circuit, too, agreed with this approach in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction,
where it applied the Inwood test to a swap meet that included counterfeit
recordings, reasoning that again, the swap meet provided a marketplace
for the sale of the infringing recordings. 6 0
These principles have translated uncomfortably to the world of
Internet Service Providers (ISP), which in turn creates added instability for
platforms. Here, courts have generally followed a proposition advanced by
the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, which held
that if an ISP exercises "direct control and monitoring" over the infringing
conduct, it can be held liable for secondary liability. 6 1 If the ISP serves as

56. Id. at 854.
57. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149 (7th Cir. 1992) ("To be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and
deliberately fail to investigate").
5 8. Id.
59. Id. at 1148-50 (vacating judgment against defendant and remanding to district
court for further proceedings as to whether defendant knew or had reason to know of
counterfeit sales).
60. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Hard
Rock Cafe's application of the Inwood test is sound; a swap meet can not [sic] disregard
its vendors' blatant trademark infringements with impunity. Thus, Fonovisa has also
stated a claim for contributory trademark infringement").
61. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.
1999) ("Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to
infringe the plaintiffs mark permits the expansion of Inwood Lab.'s "supplies a product"
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a passive "routing service," like domain name registrars, for example,
which links domain names to the IP addresses of their web hosting
servers, then the ISP can be immune from claims of contributory
liability. 6 2 If, however, the ISP is able to exercise significant control over
the means of infringement, like hosting providers, search engines, or an
online marketplace, then the Inwood test will apply. 6 3 If Inwood is deemed
to apply, the inquiry explores the question of intentional inducement and
whether the ISP continued to provide services to an infringer who it
constructively or actually knew was infringing. 6 4
Both issues are difficult to resolve, however, particularly in the online
context. Intentional inducement requires evidence of active involvement
by an ISP, and this kind of "smoking gun" evidence is hard to come by. 6 5
For example, one popular type of trademark infringement lawsuit is in the
context of keyword advertising, where plaintiffs allege that defendant ISPs
have induced advertisers to infringe plaintiffs marks through the use of
keyword suggestion tools. 6 6 Some courts have held in these situations that
there is no inducement because the recommendation is purely algorithmic,
leaving the ultimate decision over whether to adopt the keyword in the
hands of the advertiser. 67 The same is true for evidence of knowledge by
requirement for contributory infringement.").
62. Teague, supra note 50, at 471-72.
63. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984 (adopting the Hard Rock and Fonovisa test for
contributory liability where an entity has .'suppl[ied] the necessary marketplace"').
Courts have held that each of these types of ISPs could be liable for contributory
infringement because they control the infringers' access. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that, while ecommerce websites
could be contributorily liable for trademark infringement, eBay was not liable), Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding a hosting provider contributorily liable for hosting websites that it constructively
knew were selling counterfeit products), GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700
(E.D. Va. 2004).
64. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854 (1982).
65. Rian C. Dawson, Wiggle Room: Problems and Virtues of the Inwood Standard,
91 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (2016).
66. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp v. Google Inc., 562 F. 3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing how Google's suggestion tool works).
67. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va.
2010). However, the Fourth Circuit later vacated the decision that had dismissed the
contributory liability claims, and remanded the case back to the district court. 676 F.3d
144 (4th Cir. 2012). Rosetta Stone and Google later settled the case. See Eric Goldman,
With Rosetta Stone Settlement, Google Gets Closer to Legitimizing Billions of AdWords
Revenue, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2012/ 1/with rosetta st.htm. Recent cases involving "hosting" sites adopt a
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the ISP. Even if an ISP has general knowledge that their service or site is
being used to infringe, without specific knowledge of infringement,
however, an ISP can generally escape liability, since there is no
affirmative duty to actively prevent trademark infringement from
occurring.68
Although the American approach might appear predictable and
uniform, it nevertheless produces unintended consequences. As one
commentator has explained, because Inwood's knowledge standards are so
unclear, it can lead to an overreaction among platforms, leading to overresponsiveness to trademark owners' notice and takedown requests. 6 9 in
turn, an overreactive impulse carries a disparate impact on small
businesses and smaller platforms, who are often ill equipped to defend
themselves against potentially false claims of contributory infringement.
Consider a pair of cases, one from the Second Circuit and one from the
Ninth Circuit, both influential circuits in the cyber-law space. The first,
Tiffany v. eBay, decided by the Second Circuit in 2010, involved Tiffany
(the luxury jewelry manufacturer) claiming that eBay infringed Tiffany's
trademarks by allowing unauthorized sales through the eBay platform.
While the court absolved eBay for liability based on its extensive anticounterfeiting program, it also noted that "[w]hen it has reason to suspect
that users of its service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield
itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the
other way."7 0 There, the court took great efforts to demonstrate eBay's
good faith, illustrated by eBay's immediate actions to not only take down
listings that Tiffany declared as infringing, and took affirmative steps to
7
identify and remove counterfeit items.n
At the same time, it also rejected
the idea that a "generalized knowledge that its service is being used to sell
counterfeit goods" establishes contributory liability. 72 Instead, the standard
required some specific knowledge about which listings were infringing or
likely to infringe in the future.73 Because eBay responded promptly to

similar stance of active engagement. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Cloudflare, Inc., No. CV 16505 1-GW(AFMx), 2017 WL 1520444 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017) (dismissing plaintiff's
contributory infringement claim against defendant Steadfast, an ISP host based on a lack
of sufficient allegations of inducement).

68. See Tifany, 600 F.3d at 107.
69. Teague, supra note 50, at 475-76.
70. Tifany, 600 F.3d at 109.
71. Id. at 100.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Stacey L. Dogan, We Know It When We See It: Intermediary Trademark
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Tiffany's notifications, Tiffany could not satisfy this standard for
contributory liability. 74 This decision could be potentially interpreted to
require platforms to implement multimillion-dollar anti-infringement
programs.7 5 This would not only push smaller platforms out of the entry
marketplace, but could also push established platforms away from
introducing new products, like Amazon.com's product suggestion feature
- for fear of facing liability.
The second case, involving Louis Vuitton and Akanoc, a web hosting
provider, demonstrates the risk from not being over-responsive or not
mirroring the multimillion dollar efforts of eBay. 76 In that case, Akanoc,
after receiving multiple notices from Louis Vuitton that some of its
websites were selling counterfeit merchandise, forwarded the notice to the
alleged infringers, rather than take down the sites. In that case, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Akanoc was serving in a way that was analogous to
the Fonovisa flea market operator, noting that hosting websites is the
digital equivalent of renting real estate. Because Akanoc had failed to
remove the web sites upon notice, the court reasoned that it had been
"willfully blind," leading to a 32-million-dollar verdict in favor of Louis
Vuitton. 78

Although the two cases came out differently, they both left a number
of questions unanswered, since both failed to specify precisely what
actions platforms must take to avoid "shielding itself' from knowledge of
infringement. eBay's multimillion dollar VeRo program saved it from
millions in infringement damages. The decision in Akanoc seems to imply
that this type of program has become the defining standard for all
platforms in the future. As Jordan Teague notes,
[W]hile the eBays of the world can afford to spend millions of
dollars combating counterfeiting, this may not be the case for
smaller-scale market participants. Requiring 'mom and pop'
online brokers to wage a million-dollar war against
counterfeiting would likely drive these retailers out of business,
undesirably narrowing consumer choice.7 9

Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 7, 8 (2011).
74. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 110.
75. See Teague, supra note 50. at 476.
76. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.

2011).
77. Id. at 942.

78. Id. at 947.
79. Teague, supra note 50, at 491.
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In attempting to synthesize the cases in this area, Stacey Dogan argues
that trademark law reveals great solicitude towards good-faith actors, but
reserves the option to condemn trademark intermediaries who might act
with the intent or design to sow confusion.8 0 Dogan identifies a central
synergy between the holdings of eBay and those in the copyright context,
arguing that the variables of intent, design choices, and commercial
motivation help to sort out whether the defendant would be viewed as a
"good" or "bad" actor.8 ' As she argues:
Good guys need not redesign their systems or proactively root
out infringement that those systems enable; they need. only
respond to specific instances of infringement that they know
about and can stop. They face liability under copyright or
trademark law only if they fail to act in the face of such actual
knowledge. Bad guys, in contrast, are liable without regard to
actual knowledge; having designed their product or service to
accomplish unlawful ends, they are charged with the natural
consequences of its use. In both copyright and trademark law,
then, good guys get the benefits of rigorous liability standards
and broad safe harbors; bad guys find themselves in trouble. 82
For Dogan, the emergence of a fault-based standard for intermediary
liability is partially attributable to Sony's dictate to avoid sublimating
technological progress to the protection of copyright and trademark law,
while recognizing some areas of liability for those whose core business
models are specifically designed to enable infringement. 8 3
Unfortunately for macrobrands and microbrands, this has led to an
environment of uncertainty and tension, which is likely unsustainable as a
long-term business strategy. In fact, this lack of certainty led five platform
companies - Etsy, Foursquare, Kickstarter, Meetup, and Shapeways - to
advocate for greater certainty in the trademark enforcement area vis d vis
platforms. 84 The platforms note in a joint statement that "[a] lack of
statutory protections from trademark infringement claims has pushed
Commenters to react to many complaints by unquestioningly removing
content from their sites. Over the long term, this absence of protection will

80. Dogan, supra note 73, at 6.

81. Id. at 8-9.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 10-11.
84. See Etsy, Foursquare, Kickstarter, Meetup, & Shapeways, Comments in the
Matter of Development of the Joint Strategic Planfor IntellectualPropertyEnforcement
(Oct. 16, 2015) http://extfiles.etsy.com/advocacy/EtsyIPECComment.pdf.
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slow the growth of free expression and commerce that has been the
hallmark of the Internet." 85 This Article will revisit the solutions that the
platforms propose in Part IV below. Before doing so, it is important to
look at how other jurisdictions have been dealing with the same issues in
order to learn from their successes and failures.
B.

COMPARATIVE APPROACHES: EUROPE AND CANADA

One of the striking features of platforms is their "glocalized" natureplatforms, while global companies, need to rely on local service providers
to perform the services. 86 Although there have been efforts at discussing
an international liability standard with respect to ISPs, the efforts have not
been successful.8 7 This has meant that individual jurisdictions have crafted
their own rules and standards (as seen in the discussion above in the
United States), and so it is important to understand the differing
approaches. This Article will look at Europe and Canada, where the
questions of liability may be similar, but the answers differ.
1. European Union
Within Europe, the answers to the difficult question of platform
liability tends to be grounded in one of three directives: (1) the Electronic
Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive), adopted in 2000," (2) the
Enforcement Directive, adopted in 2004,89 and (3) the Information Society
Directive, adopted in 2001.90 The E-Commerce Directive aims to protect
certain types of ISPs from liability (either direct or secondary), whereas
the Enforcement Directive and the Information Society Directive may
provide different grounds for national courts to hold ISPs liable.

85. Id. at 2.
86. See Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 47 (2010) (discussing glocalization in the context of
consumers and trademark perception).
87. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liabilityfor Online Trademark Infringement:
The InternationalLandscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 467-68 (2014).
88. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32000L003 1.
89. See Council Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 195), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004LOO48R%2801%29.
http://eur2001/29,
2001
O.J.
(L
167),
90. See Council Directive
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF;
Christiane Wendehorst, Platform Intermediary Services and Duties under the ECommerce Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive, 5 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L.

30 (2016).
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With respect to immunizing certain types of ISPs, the E-Commerce
Directive categorizes three types of ISPs: caching, conduit, and hosting. 9 1
Should the ISP fall within one of these categories, then the ISP would be
immune from direct liability of infringement based on its activities with
respect to its users. 9 2 For example, the Court of Justice of the European
Union has held keyword advertising programs run by the likes of Google
or even eBay are seemingly immune from liability. 9 3 However, even with
the E-Commerce Directive attempting to harmonize the EU member
country approach, individual member countries within the European
Union have been able to place differing levels of liability on ISPs. For
example, France has held that eBay is considered more than a mere "host,"
which has meant greater responsibility on it to monitor its site for
counterfeit products. 9 4
In addition, the Court of Justice of the EU has also held that secondary
liability standards are to be assessed at the national level. 95 This now
allows each member country to apply its own laws with respect to
secondary liability, which do differ. For example, the United Kingdom has
a more stringent standard to meet in order to be liable as an "accessory,"
whereby a plaintiff must prove that the defendant "conspired with the
primary party or procured or induced his commission of the tort . . . ."96

&

91. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178), Art. 12-14.
92. As one commentator has observed, "The E-Commerce Directive seemed to
adopt the basic idea of section 512, namely, a grant of safe harbors from liability for
specific intermediary activities, and indeed closely tracked the language of the DMCA in
places-particularly with regard to the descriptions of those activities and the conditions
for limiting liability." Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and their European
Counterparts:A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L.
ARTS 481, 482 (2009).
93. Dinwoodie, supra note 87, at 482-84 (discussing the Google France and
L'Oreal cases). The caveat is that search engines must not have participated actively in
the infringement. Case C-324/09, L'Oreal SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011,
P113; P115. This is left up to the national courts to decide. See id. There are indications
that even using a keyword suggestion tool would be exempt from liability, as German
courts have held. See Annette Kur, Secondary Liabilityfor Trademark Infringement on
the Internet: The Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU, 37 COLuM. J.L. & ARTS

525, 531 (2014).
94. Teague, supra note 50, at 473. See also Peguera, supra note 92, at 499-512
(discussing a number of other European court cases along similar lines, including the
French eBay case).
95. See Case C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 2010 E.C.R.
1-2467, Para 107, 1-2511., http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%

3A62008CJ0236.
96. Dinwoodie, supra note 87, at 485 (quoting L'Oreal SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011
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This is contrasted with Germany, which takes a slightly less stringent
approach, finding liability if there was a "willful adequate causal
contribution to the infringing acts of any third party; the legal and factual
possibility of preventing the resulting direct infringements; and the
violation of a reasonable duty of care to prevent these infringements." 9 7
Even though the European Union has introduced "notice-and-action"
procedures, these are not formalized. 98 As such, much of the procedures
that are in place are privately regulated, such as the efforts of the European
Commission working with brand owners and Internet platforms regarding
the sale of counterfeit goods. 99 However, even with these informal
procedures, combined with the legal uncertainty across European Union
member countries of the application of the E-Commerce Directive safe
harbors, ISPs are leery of taking additional measures that may lead to
more "effective self-regulatory measures." 1 00
2.

Canada

In Canada, the picture is less clear than in the European Union and the
United States. As a relatively small market, Canada has seen
comparatively little litigation about trademarks and platform liability. oi
E.C.R. 1-6011).
97. Matthias Leistner, Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in
Europe, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc. 75, 78-79 (2014).
98. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 0.J. (L 178) on certain legal aspects of
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on electronic commerce), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
exempt
(obligating
member
states
to
?uri=CELEX:32000L003 1&from=EN.
intermediaries from liability in situations listed in Section 4, but not requiring any
specific "notice and action" procedure, like in the DMCA). Except some member states
have enacted provisions statutorily, like France. See Peguera,supra note 92, at 490-91.
99. See EUROPEAN

COMMISSION,

ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/enforcementen
(describing the European Commission's efforts in coordinating voluntary agreements
among brand owners).
100. European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for
Europe (May 25, 2016) at 9, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288.
101. For example, one commentator has compared Canada's 2014 Gross Domestic
Product to that of the state of Texas. See Mark J. Perry, Putting the Ridiculously Large
$18 Trillion US Economy Into Perspective by Comparing State GDPs to Entire
Countries, AEIDEAS, (June 10, 2015), http://www.aei.org/publication/putting-theridiculously-large- 1 8-trillion-us-economy-into-perspective-by-comparing-state-gdps-toentire-countries/.
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This could be due to the smaller percentage of Canadians who have used
such platforms, as compared to Americans, or that Canada is simply a
smaller market than the United States. 102 In the area of keyword
advertising, where litigation in the United States has been quite active,
Canada had its first case only in 2015.103 And even in this case, the
litigation was between two competitors regarding whether the defendant's
purchase of the plaintiff's trademarks as keywords was likely to confuse
Internet users. 104 Another reason for the lack of intermediary trademark
infringement lawsuits is that Canada does not have a secondary liability
regime for online uses of trademarks.10 5
However, this may be changing, as a recent case involving Google's
role as a global search engine shows. In Google v. Equustek Solutions,106
the defendants had previously been found to be guilty of passing off its
electronic devices as the plaintiff s. 107 The lower court judgment had
ordered the defendant to stop its sales, however, the defendant did not
comply. Google, which was not a party to the lawsuit, had removed the
defendant's websites from the search results that would show up in a
102. For a quick comparison (but not necessarily scientific), compare
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170228/dql70228b-eng.htm
(Canada)
with
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/ (U.S.).
103. Michelle Kerluke, Canadian trademarks and keyword advertising: the unsettled
debate over trademark keywords, PhD diss., Univ. of British Colum. (2016),
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/58805, at ii.
104. Vancouver Community College v. Vancouver Career College (Burnaby), 2015

BCSC 1470.
105. See Michael Geist, No Monitoring & No Liability: What the Supreme Court's
Google v. Equustek Decision Does Not Do, MICHAEL GEIST (Jun. 29, 2017)
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/no-monitoring-no-liability-supreme-courts-googlev-equustek-decision-not (discussing the response to the Equustek decision by the music

industry, which interpreted the Canadian Supreme Court to hold that "facilitating"
infringement was liable in Canada, an interpretation that Professor Geist believes is
incorrect).

106. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 S.C.C. 34, https://seccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/sec-csc/en/item/1670 1/index.do.
107. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/
bcsc/doc/2014/2014bcscl063/2014bcscl063.html. In this case, defendants had been
former distributors of plaintiffs' products and were accused of a number of infringements
of the plaintiffs' intellectual property. First, defendants were accused of using the
plaintiffs' trade secrets to design and manufacture a similar product that competed with
the plaintiffs'. In addition, before selling their own product, defendants passed off
plaintiffs' products as their own by covering up the trademarks on the actual product.
And in selling their own product, defendants advertised using plaintiffs' products, but
would deliver orders using their own product. Id. at paras 3-9.
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search on google.ca, but Canadians could still access defendant's websites
on other Google sites. This led the plaintiff to ask the court to compel
Google to block the defendant's sites on a global basis, which it
granted.os
The secondary liability implications stem from the lower court's
statement that, "Google is an innocent bystander but it is unwittingly
facilitating the defendants' ongoing breaches of this Court's orders. There
is no other practical way for the defendants' website sales to be stopped.
There is no other practical way to remove the defendants' websites from
Google's search results."l 09 Google appealed the case all the way to the
Canadian Supreme Court.1 10 Although most commentators have focused
on the free speech and forum-shopping implications stemming from
Canadian Supreme Court decision,"' language that the Supreme Court
uses does appear to support opening the door to secondary liability in the
online trademark infringement context.1 12 In fact, the Canadian music
industry appears to have interpreted the Supreme Court language in this

108. Equustek, 2014 BCSC 1063, at paras 10, 159.
109. Id. at para 156.
110. Google Inc.., 2017
S.C.C.
34, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/16701/index.do.
111. Mike Masnick, CanadianSupreme Court Says It's Fine To Censor The Global
Internet; Authoritarians & Hollywood Cheer, TECHDIRT (June 28, 2017),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170628/11273937689/canadian-supreme-court-saysfine-to-censor-global-internet-authoritarians-hollywood-cheer.shtml;
Howard
Knopf,
Google Suffers Severe Setback from the Supreme Court of Canada, Excess Copyright
(June 28,
2017),
http://excesscopyright.blogspot.ca/201 7/06/google-suffers-severesetback-from.html; EFF, Top Canadian Court Permits Worldwide Internet Censorship
(Jun. 28, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/top-canadian-court-permitsworldwide-internet-censorship; Daphne Keller, Ominous: Canadian Court Orders
Google to Remove Search Results Globally, CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y BLOG (Jun. 28.
2017) http://cyberlaw.stanford.eduiblog/2017/06/ominous-canadian-court-orders-googleremove-search-results-globally; Michael Geist, Global Internet Takedown Orders Come
to Canada: Supreme Court Upholds InternationalRemoval of Google Search Results,
MICHAEL GEIST (June 28, 2017), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-intemettakedown-orders-come-canada-supreme-court-upholds-intemational-removal-googlesearch-results/.
112. Google Inc.., 2017 S.C.C. 34, at para 53 ("This does not make Google liable for
this harm. It does, however, make Google the determinative player in allowing the harm
to occur."). See also Adam Bobker & Janice Calzavara, Leave to Appeal to SCC: Google
Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc (BCCA), BERESKIN & PARR (Mar. 7, 2016)
http://www.bereskinparr.com/index.cfmn?cm=Doc&ce=downloadPDF&primaryKey-733
(discussing the lower court case).

1156

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1135

manner, issuing a press release that celebrates the decision.1 13 However,
there are varying interpretations, in particular, Michael Geist's counterargument that the Supreme Court did not open this door." 4
Notwithstanding these developments in secondary liability, there is a
parallel claim of negligence for failing to act on knowledge of wrongdoing
that could be made. The kernel of this argument is found in Louis Vuitton
v. Lin, where a landlord was held liable for knowingly allowing
counterfeit products to be sold at their premises."' Similar to the "swap
meet" cases of Hard Rock and Fonovisa in the U.S. discussed above, the
court held that the landlord had a duty to investigate serious allegations of
wrongdoing.1 6 While this argument has not been made with respect to
platforms, some commentators believe that this line of reasoning could be
plausibly extended to the online context. 117 However, given the
application by U.S. courts of the swap meet cases to platform infringement
cases, this does seem like it can be a likely extension by the Canadian
courts in the future.
The existing situation becomes somewhat circular: because of the
indeterminacy of the law, many parties have resorted to out-of-court
settlements as a more viable option, leaving many gaps and stasis in
existing common law frameworks." 8 In addition, operating in the
"shadow of the law" leaves many smaller business entities and individuals
vulnerable to legal claims that may or may not be accurate representations
113. Press Release, Music Canada, Music Canada applauds Supreme Court of
Canada decision confirming that Internet intermediaries can be ordered to deindex illegal
sites worldwide (June 28, 2017) https://musiccanada.com/news/music-canada-applaudssupreme-court-of-canada-decision-confirming-that-internet-intermediaries-can-beordered-to-deindex-illegal-sites-worldwide/ ("Today's decision confirms that online
service providers cannot turn a blind eye to illegal activity that they facilitate; on the
contrary, they have an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent the Internet from
becoming a black market.").
114. See Geist, supra note 105 ("The music industry may have wanted the Supreme
Court of Canada to establish an affirmative duty on Google to monitor content, but the
ruling is unequivocal that there is no such requirement as a result of the Equustek
decision.").
115. This was a procedurally complicated case, with the first case holding in favor of
Louis Vuitton on a default judgment. 2007 FC 1179 (CanLIl). The second case was
where the defendant asked the court to set aside the default judgment. 2008 FC 45.
116. 2008 FC 45, ¶16.
117. See James L. Bikoff et al., Haulingin the Middleman: Contributory Trade Mark
Infringement in North America, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L & PRAc. 332, 340 (2010).
118. Teague, supra note 50, at 484-85.
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of more well-resourced entities' legal rights. 1 19 At the same time, solely
leaving these issues up to legislative bodies can result in a statutory
framework that may leave little room for judicial refinement, overlooking
the importance of restoring frameworks to protect innovation and
dynamism, a point this Article returns to in Part IV.12 0
III.

PLATFORM DECENTRALIZATION AND THE
MICROBRAND

On the platform, everyone gets to be an entrepreneur. Scholars have
written extensively about the culture of "micro-entrepreneurship,"
particularly in the developing world. 12 1 in some countries, like Bolivia, for
example, individuals engage in entrepreneurial activities at three times the
rate in the United States. 122 Such entrepreneurial engagement also creates
opportunities for small and medium-size businesses to market themselves
more effectively, particularly since the platform economy can function as
a powerful tool for digital marketing.1 23 App builders can create on
platforms like Android, iOS, Amazon Web Services, and others. 124 Idle
time can be taken up by serving as a driver for Lyft or Uber, vacant space
by renting on Airbnb. Some individuals, virtually, provide goods through
platforms like app stores, YouTube, or Amazon self-publishing. Agencies
cater to "influencers" on YouTube, transforming individuals into stars
with substantial followings. Irrespective of the specific platform, all of
them direct themselves towards a single goal: encouraging everyone to
contribute.1 25 The most optimistic picture, then, suggests that the
everyday individual can be readily transformed into an entrepreneur, able
to take advantage of scheduling flexibility and able to monetize their
personal and professional assets towards this goal. 126
In turn, the mini-entrepreneur facilitates the emergence of the
microbrand. Even in digital space, platforms enable the transformation of
119. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L.
REv. 409, 412 (2015).
120. See Teague, supra note 50, at 485.

121. Karl Loo, How the Gig Economy CouldDrive Growth in Developing Countries,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 12:04PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/03/23/
how-the-gig-economy-could-drive-growth-in-developing-countries/#3db6d56a4a49.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2, at 1.
125. Id at 2.
126. Id.
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an everyday citizen into a brand. As one study observes, "[t]he similarities
between the online presentation of people and products, individuals and
brands, are striking: the same interfaces and tactics apply to both, making
them even more exchangeable than before."l 27 Some people have lives on
social media for the purposes of communication, others for the purposes of
promotion, connection, and still others for the purposes of expression.1 2 8
Yet a platform's marriage to self-branding transforms and synergizes all of
these purposes into one singular purpose of micro-entrepreneurship.
Even in this context, however, the governing indeterminacy over
contributory liability contributes to a particular confusion even within the
microbrand ecosystem. This next Part explores how the existing
frameworks of contributory liability contribute to a growing divide
between small and large entities, and show how the architecture of
platforms contributes to this disparate impact.
A.

MICROENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE MICROBRAND

Nearly every prominent platform encourages the "self-branding" of
entrepreneurs, enabling ordinary citizens to essentially become corporate
entities by building a consumer following. Much of these views are
inextricably linked to a conception of the self that is intertwined with the
idea of commodification. Under this approach, linked to the idea of
"possessive individualism," we all own ourselves, as property, and
therefore our capacity to contribute is linked metaphorically to the notion
of property.1 2 9
Airbnb, for example, explicitly uses language about creating a microbrand: "Your brand, or micro-brand, is what makes your listing unique
and helps you stand out from the competition. Branding your listing is of
utmost importance! Proper branding ensures that your listing resonates
with your target market and attracts ideal guests." 3 0
In another typical example, a pair of Brown University students started
a company, Teespring, that will only agree to produce shirts when preorders reach a minimum threshold, thereby eliminating risk for the
average producer, enabling them to scale production quickly and

127. Jos6 van Dijck, 'You have one identity': performing the self on Facebook and
Linkedln, 35 MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc. 199, 207 (2013).

128. Id. at 211.
129. Ilana Gershon, Selling Your Self in the United States, Political and Legal, 37
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 281, 288 (2014).
is
Good
Business
GUIDE,
Good
Design
130. AIRBNB
https://www.airbnbguide.com/good-design-is-good-business/.
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effectively. 13 1 The model is again a "microbrand": the production of
"products that are tailored towards individual affinities[,] rather than
consumption for the mass market." 1 32 The company has received tens of
millions in venture capital financing, and hundreds have earned more than
six figures from their micro-production (not including launching at least
ten millionaires). 133 In another context, some entrepreneurs in the
consignment economy have grown so large that they have received
venture capital investment. 134
Even when some kinds of mini businesses are not known for their
profit, they still create new formations of platform entrepreneurship.1 35
Influencers, for example, have been touted as the new brands, described as
"the golden children of marketing strategies right now." 1 36 Some studies
argue that consumers trust influencers far more than they trust
advertisements or even celebrity endorsements.1 37 Here, too, platforms
have emerged to provide a springboard to match influencers with
particular brands.1 38 MuseFind, for example, exists as a platform that
assists brands to find relevant influencers for their target audience, and
then monitors their performance in marketing a brand.1 39 Often, the
effectiveness of an influencer campaign depends on how "authentically"
she is viewed by the target audience, leveraging an economy of trust
between the consumer and the influencer.1 40
Alice Marwick, in her book Status Update, explains that the concept of
"self-branding" has become an essential Web 2.0 strategy, something that
is firmly instilled in today's business culture. 141 The idea, at its simplest, is
to match marketing strategies with the individual entrepreneur, "a way of
131. Marcus Wohlsen, These Guys Made a T-Shirt. Now Silicon Valley Is Giving
Them Millions, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2014) https://www.wired.com/2014/1 1/guys-made-tshirt-now-silicon-valley-giving-millions-2/.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2, at 66.
135. Id.
136. Deborah Weinswig, Influencers are the New Brands, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2016,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahweinswig/2016/10/05/influencers-are9:30AM)
the-new-brands/#618c60217919.
137. Id (citing study by MuseFind that shows 92% of consumers trust influencers
more than other forms of marketing).
138. Id.
13 9. Id.
140. Id.
141. ALICE E. MARWICK, STATUS UPDATE 164 (2013).
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thinking about the self as a salable commodity that can tempt a potential
employer."l 4 2 Social media, here, is essential to enable widespread selfpromotion. 143 She quotes an article by Tom Peters that appeared in FAST
COMPANY, titled "The Brand Called You," that relates:
The main chance is becoming a free agent in an economy of free
agents, looking to have the best season you can imagine in your
field, looking to do your best work and chalk up a remarkable
track record, and looking to establish your own micro equivalent
of the Nike swoosh.... The good news-and it is largely good
news-is that everyone has a chance to stand out. Everyone has
a chance to learn, improve, and build up their skills. Everyone
has a chance to be a brand worthy of remark.14 4
Here, several factors-the rise of megacorporate brands, coupled with
an entrepreneurial mindset and project-based work cultures-all
contribute to the individualistic, decentralized world of the microbrand.1 4 5
In some cases, because microbranding is linked to a changeable, fluid,
human personality, as opposed to a fixed product, it creates new
vulnerabilities, requiring even greater brand management, surveillance and
enforcement.1 4 6 Some individuals set up Google alerts to let them know
when they are mentioned online; others use Twitter and other software to
let them know when they are being replied to or retweeted; others spend
hours combing social media looking for references to their name or
brand. 14 7 Marwick quotes Glenda Bautista, who served as head of product
for video at AOL who describes an endless chain of self-policing and
policing of others, constantly asking others to take photographs, and
peppering commentary with references to high-status individuals, even
when their relationships are remote. 148 As Marwick explains, this process
"requires continually imagining oneself through the eyes of others,

142. Id. at 166.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 165 (quoting Tom Peters, The Brand Called You, FAST COMPANY (Aug.
31, 1997) https://www.fastcompany.com/28905/brand-called-you).
145. Id, At the same time, however, as Marwick wams us, the benefits of selfbranding can tend to privilege a certain demographic-white, wealthy males who have
considerable independence relative to female or minority demographics, who may have
less flexibility to devote time to self-branding opportunities. See id. at 180-81.
146. Gershon, supra note 129, at 290.
147. Marwick, supra note 141, at 190.
148. Id. at 190-91.
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creating a 'dual gaze' of internalized surveillance."l 4 9 Through this
process of surveillance and monitoring, self-branding produces an "edited
self," someone who appears to be "an entrepreneur whose product is a
neatly packaged, performed identity." 5 0 In other contexts, like Uber,
entrepreneurs are incentivized through ratings and other reputational tools
to encourage effective performance, unlike cab drivers who are typically
anonymous and unknown to the passenger.' 5
While at first glance it may seem that self-branding and trademark law
rarely intersect, the truth is that they draw upon similar concerns regarding
property, identity, and association. The endless cycle of self-branding and
brand monitoring affects trademark enforcement in two primary ways.
First, it may incentivize microbrands to spend significant resources of time
and money to enforce their trademarks, due in part to the constantly
changing brand environment they inhabit. Second, the constant pull of
brand monitoring may lead macrobrands, in turn, to internalize the same
range of additional costs faced by microbrands, leading, again, to
trademark surveillance and overenforcement. Finally, these disparities in
turn, can contribute to a widening divide between smaller and larger
platforms that may have different abilities and resources to address
enforcement, thus impacting the path of platform innovation.
B.

MICROBRANDING AND CONTRBUTORY LIABILITY

In the context of platforms, many scholars and commentators have
raised the question of whether there is a hierarchical distinction between
the "platform owner" and the entrepreneurs and contractors that facilitate
this economy.' 5 2 The same question, we argue, might also be posed in the
trademark arena, that is, whether our system of contributory liability, as
well intended as it might be, facilitates the formation of an unequal system
that extends the benefits of trademark protection and enforcement to a
few, but radically undervalues the contributions of the mini entrepreneurs
that characterize platform vitality. The absence of statutory safe harbors in
the trademark context often has a particularly deleterious effect on smaller
ISPs and related platforms, who may face different challenges based on

149. Id. at 191.
150. Id. at 195.
151. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber's
Driver-Partnersin the United States 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper

No. 22843).
152. Kenney & Zysman, supra note 2, at 67.
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their limited legal resources. 15 3 Many smaller ISPs do not have automated
systems to respond to 512 notices, and therefore an attention to the
diversity of ISP platforms is especially critical in considering how to
design better systems of notification and enforcement. 1 5 4
According to Stacey Dogan, existing trademark frameworks
unwittingly encourage aggressive behavior through two central
mechanisms.1 5 5 The first involves the oft-mentioned trope that trademark
owners must police their marks. 1 5 6 The existing lack of clarity regarding
trademark owner's duty to police can lead to overenforcement, lending
further strength to the perception that "stronger" marks receive more
protection, and "weaker" marks get less. As Dogan explains, although
trademark owners are required to take certain steps to enforce their marks,
the confusion regarding the required level of notice to prospective
defendants encourages them to take an "object first, analyze later"
approach.1 5 7 As a result, many trademark owners take an approach that
objects to all third party uses of their marks, even when confusion does not
result.' 5 8 Dogan concludes, therefore, that many cases of trademark
bullying involves value maximizing choices-trademark owners object,
not because they risk "losing their marks if they fail to object, but because
their rights will be more valuable if their objection succeeds."1 5 9
Consider dilution protections, as one example. Even though the
strongest, most famous marks carry the least risk of losing their
distinctiveness, the law's existing framework directs courts to consider the
extent to which a mark holder engages in "substantially exclusive use of
the mark," thereby indirectly encouraging trademark holders to overpolice
their marks to satisfy this standard.1 60 Similar concerns regarding
exclusivity also carry over into the standard for infringement, as well. This
leads trademark owners to police their marks for anything remotely
appearing similar, as a function of preserving the value of a mark, rather

153. See Kickstarter, Makerbot, Meetup, & Shapeways, Additional Comments in the
Matter of Section 512, Docket No. 2015-7, at 3 (Feb. 23, 2017).
154. See id., at 3-4.
155. Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity

Law, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1293, 1318 (2016).
156. Id. (explaining that, in reality, their responsibilities are much more limitedthey do not lose their rights by failing to object to uses that are non-infringing).
157. Id. at 1318-19.
158. Id. at 1319.
159. Id.

160. Id
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than guarding against a true risk of confusion. 161
These harms become even more apparent when we turn to the
architecture of platforms. Due to the absence of trademark safe harbors,
ISPs cannot institute a counter notice procedure for solely trademarkrelated claims; and as a result, users do not have the ability to challenge
the notification and keep their work online.1 6 2 Etsy, for example, has
observed that its number of trademark-related takedown notices is greater
than the copyright-related ones that it has received. 1 6 3 It offers examples of
the notices it has faced: one involving a graphic designer using the
trademarked name of a television show on a set of custom party
invitations; an artist using a trademarked cartoon character in a humorous
oil painting; or a small business owner who repackages food packaging
into purses and liquor bottles into drinking cups.' 64 Even though each of
these instances might be the subject of strong arguments for noninfringing uses, each of them was the subject of a takedown notice. 16 5
Because of the absence of clear safe harbors in the ISP context with
respect to trademark law, commentators have argued that many ISPs will
not challenge trademark requests in order to avoid becoming embroiled in
costly litigation.166 As a recent filing by Etsy and other platforms
concluded, "[t]he result is that a trademark claim - even one built on a
weak foundation - can be an effective way to permanently quash the
speech or economic activity of others." 67 In such cases, because of the
complexity of trademark law, and the David vs. Goliath status of the user
vs. the trademark owner, respectively, ISPs may not even provide the user
with an opportunity to challenge the assertion of infringement.16 8 Here,
small businesses, individual entrepreneurs, and ordinary creators might be
most affected by such notices, simply because they lack the resources and

161.

Id. at 1321 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND

UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.91 (4th ed.): "[t]he only way a trademark owner can prevent
the market from being crowded with similar marks is to undertake an assertive program
of policing adjacent 'territory' and suing those who edge too close").
162. See Etsy, Foursquare, Kickstarter, Makerbot, Meetup, Shapeways, & Stratasys,
Comments in the Matter of Section 512, Docket No. 2015-7, at 3 (Apr. 1, 2016).
163. Id. at 3.
164. See Etsy, et al., supra note 84, at 3.

165. Id.
166. See Etsy, et al., supra note 162, at 3.
167. See id.

168. See id
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channels to challenge their targeting. 169 And smaller ISPs, since they may
be unable to afford the legal resources required to investigate a claim, may
err on the side of over-accommodation as a result.17 0 Over the long term,
these abusive practices can have the effect of actually undermining
support for intellectual property altogether. As Etsy and others have noted,
"[a] steady stream of examples of abuse can reduce the legitimacy of
rightsholders as a whole in the eyes of the public, thus reducing public
support for enforcement even in legitimate cases of infringement." 1 7 1
Further, because of the absence of trademark-related safe harbors,
many platforms have reported situations where a rightsholder conflates
both copyright and trademark-related requests in the same notice, knowing
that the absence of a safe harbor in trademark requests will make it much
more likely that an ISP will respond by taking down the content.1 72 For
example, a rightsholder might object to content that includes a character
(protected by copyright) and its name (that is protected by trademark).1 73
The 3D printing company, Shapeways, for example, has found that in
2015, 76% of the copyright takedowns include trademark-related
claims.1 74 A year later, Shapeways noted that although the number of
overlap claims had significantly reduced overall, it still found that the
majority of its most defective takedown claims were trademark-related.1 75
Yet consider the result of this overlap. Since Shapeways does not
generally accept counter notices for non-copyright claims, this means that
the majority of its users targeted by takedown requests are unable to
respond to these allegations. 176 As a result, this loophole essentially
enables a rightsholder to evade the counter-notice requirements under the
DMCA, since trademark law does not allow for the same process, thereby
risking overenforcement and abuse.1 77 "Even if a user intends to challenge
the copyright portion of the request, the trademark portion often remains

169. See id at 4.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 5.
172. See Etsy, et al., supra note 162, at 5.
173. Id. ("For example, a rightsholder may request the removal of user content
consisting of a copyright-protected character and its trademark-protected name.").
174. See SHAPEWAYS, 2016 Transparency Report, at https://www.shapeways.com/
legal/transparency/2016.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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unchallengeable, resulting in the targeted content staying down." 17 8 Since
the vast majority of such cases are resolved privately, "OSPs are largely
left to create their own patchwork of policies, hoping that their decisions
strike a reasonable balance between enforcement and expression. This
results in an uneven, largely undocumented shadow dispute resolution
process that breeds an under appreciation for the scope of the problem and
a lack of uniform rules to help guide their resolution," commentators
observe.

179

In such cases, it is important to distinguish between abusive trademark
enforcement and enforcement that seeks to execute legitimate trademark
rights. 8 0 While the latter goal is clearly deserving of support, the former
scenario - overenforcement - has a deleterious effect on startups and
smaller platforms that may lack the resources to respond properly to a
dispute. In such situations, the assertion of overbroad trademark rights,
facilitated by an overreliance on automated systems of enforcement, may
produce false positives without significant human oversight."' In some
cases, these complaints can be sent by a rightsholder who uses these
notices to undermine a competitor or to censor critical commentary. 8 2 For
example, a recent filing noted an incident where a political action
committee requested a takedown of material that parodied Hilary
Clinton's campaign logo.' 8 3 Or a similar situation where another
candidate, Ben Carson, requested takedown requests regarding
merchandise that used Carson's name on items relating to his
candidacy.1 84 Often, these claims involve a mixture of trademark and
copyright claims, further muddying the waters of potential defenses, but
they can often involve politically oriented speech worthy of protection. 8 1
The collective effect of these claims, however, limits the potential
circulation of the free flow of information and ideas, further amplifying
how smaller platforms become implicated in a system of overbroad (and
inconsistent) regulation.

178. Etsy, et al., supra note 162, at 5.

179. Id. at 5.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See
See
See
See

id. at 2.
SHAPEWAYS, supra note 175.
id.
id. at 3.

184. See id.
185. See id.
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REFORMING PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE THROUGH
TRADEMARK MODERNIZATION

Platforms, then, present us with a curious paradox: as much as
platforms disrupt conventional business models and challenge classic
assumptions about regulation, they also can enable a rise in regulation
characterized by increases in permitting, licensing, and protection.' 86 in
other words, the absence of law facilitates the rise of platforms, but the
rise of platforms requires a regulatory system to sustain its growth. In sum,
at the same time that platforms challenge established theories of the
market, they also facilitate increased regulation.
The same can also be said regarding how our intellectual property
system intersects with platform architecture. Particularly regarding
trademark law, platforms provide us with the opportunity to look for ways
to harmonize the interaction of microbrands and macrobrands while
encouraging the development and protection of platform enterprises. As
Rob Merges has argued in the platform context, intellectual property rights
confer on their owners merely an option to enforce their rights.' 8 7 This
suggests that at times, the law may need to regulate the ex post policing of
intellectual property enforcement in flexible and careful ways to ensure a
balance between competition and regulation.' Drawing in part from these
observations, this final Part explores a number of ways in which trademark
law can be modernized to better address the challenges presented by
platform architecture. Here, acknowledging that there is no "silver bullet"
to resolve these complex issues, this Article analyzes a variety of potential
improvements to the law from different angles. While change can occur by
legislation or through an adoption of voluntary measures by platforms
themselves, this Article's suggestions include the formation of statutory
safe harbors among platforms, a "notice-and-notice" system, as well as a
variety of changes to the common law, including the application of a
materiality of harm requirement and clarification of the duty to police.
A.

SAFE HARBORS

"True" statutory safe harbors are rare in trademark law.1 89 By "true"

186. Lobel, supra note 1, at 90.
187. See Robert P. Merges, IP Rights and Technological Platforms 18 (Dec. 1, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1315522.
188. See id. at 10.
189. This is the case, except for two very narrow statutory safe harbors for "innocent"
publisher or domain name registrar. 15 U.S.C. §1114(2). One could argue that the
exclusions from actionable dilution in Section 43(c)(3) of the Lanham Act are akin to a
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we mean categories of unauthorized trademark use that is deemed to be
non-infringing, or what some commentators refer to as "categorical
exemptions."' 90 This has likely been a conscious decision, as judges to
date have been lukewarm to the idea of categorical exemptions or "bright
line rules" in trademark law. 191 The reason for this is that trademark law
has traditionally been context-driven, with a focus on minimizing, or
avoiding altogether, consumer confusion. 192 Any attempts by judges to
create shortcuts through the lengthy, time-consuming, and expensive
analysis of the likelihood of confusion have been met with resistance. 193
However, there is a real need for such categorical exemptions in
trademark law, particularly in today's world of "trademarking
everything"1 94 in the online world. As noted previously, some platforms
safe harbor. However, it is a very narrow one, limited to nominative or descriptive fair
use in comparative advertising or social commentary (like parody, satire or criticism),
news reporting, or any noncommercial use. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). However, these types
of uses may still be subject to trademark infringement claims. In addition, there is still the

potential for a dilution claim where a judge determines that the defendant's use is not
within one of these categories. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor
Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 1022247, *16-*20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012)
(finding in favor of plaintiff Louis Vuitton that defendant Hyundai did not use the Louis
Vuitton marks within the scope of one of these exceptions and had no intent to do so).
See also William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49,
104-109 (2008) (providing a critique of the dilution safe harbor).
190. William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2267, 2272 (2010); Lisa P. Ramsey, IncreasingFirstAmendment Scrutiny of Trademark
Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008).
191. McGeveran, supra note 190, at 2268 ("Traditionally, trademark law has
eschewed per se exceptions").
192. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming TrademarkBullies, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 625, 658
(2011).
193. For example, in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.,
where the Tenth Circuit attempted to draw a somewhat bright line where the existence of
a utility patent on a product configuration would prevent trade dress. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("Where disputed product configuration is part of claim in utility patent, and
configuration is described, significant inventive aspect of the invention, so that without it
the invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its
protection as trade dress, even if configuration is nonfunctional."). The Supreme Court
blurred this bright line in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. by turning the
rule into a part of the evidentiary assessment. 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("A utility patent is
strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional").
194. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Trademarking Everything? Why Brands Should
Care About Limits on Trademark Rights, presentation at The 2015 Works-in-Progress
Intellectual Property Colloquium, United States Patent & Trademark Office, Alexandria,
VA (Feb. 6, 2015).
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themselves have argued for the need for safe harbors (as well as for a
better defined system within which to operate, which we address below in
our "notice-and-notice" proposal) due to the overwhelming nature of
trademark infringement notices that may or may not be valid.19 5 These
platforms have argued that the creation of statutory safe harbors would
increase accountability and public awareness, as well as encourage a
greater uniformity of guiding principles to address trademark disputes in
the ISP context.1 96
But a categorical exemption would also benefit macro- and microbrands in particular ways. On the macrobrand side, it would mean that
platforms are no longer required to respond to every instance of perceived
infringement. In addition, macrobrands would be able to provide clearer
guidance to the microbrands within their ecosystem about what is and
what is not acceptable.1 97 Since most of the trademark disputes occur
extra-judicially, having clear guidelines would assist all within the
platform ecosystem in deciding which claims are valid, and which involve
trademark over-enforcement (and perhaps even bullying).
In terms of specific categorical exemptions, there is a rich body of
literature already on the topic, as we are not the first scholars or
commentators to argue for trademark safe harbors. Due to space
limitations, we will mention just a few here as examples. 198 Eric Goldman
has called for a safe harbor for Internet search providers, which would
exempt such search providers from infringement liability for activities like
keyword advertising.' 99 Lisa Ramsey has argued that categorical safe
harbors should be legislatively adopted for certain uses of trademarks, or
even for certain types of defendants, such as ISPs. 200 Bill McGeveran has
crafted and argued for an entire "Trademark Fair Use Reform Act" that
would exempt trademark uses within communicative works from both
infringement and dilution claims. 2 0 1

195.

See Etsy, et al., supra note 162, at 2.

196. See id
197.

Some

platforms

do

try

to

provide

guidance.

See,

e.g.,

Etsy.com,

https://www.etsy.com/teams/7722/discussions/discuss/13810041/.
198. Due to space, we are not able to discuss all the many innovative proposals here.
On safe harbors, see Ramsey, supra note 190, at 455-56. (arguing for categorical safe
harbors to protect speech); Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) (arguing for safe harbors for Internet search providers).
199. Goldman, supra note 198, at 588-595.
200. Ramsey, supra note 190, at 455-56.
201. McGeveran, supra note 190, at 2303-2317 (arguing for safe harbors for titles of

20171

PLATFORM LAW AND THE BRAND ENTERPRISE

1169

Unfortunately, though, categorical exemptions would really only work
for the clear-cut cases. There are many uses of trademarks that fall in the
middle and for this, we would propose a new system for trademark
owners, macrobrands, and microbrands, to use in the online platform
ecosystem.
B.

"NOTICE AND NOTICE"

The secondary liability standard is one of the leading causes for
platform uncertainty in dealing with claims of trademark infringement, as
we outlined above. Exacerbating this uncertainty is a lack of a second type
of safe harbor (as opposed to the first type that we just discussed,
categorical exemptions), one that would immunize platforms and other
online entities from any trademark infringing behavior by their users. As
Part III mentions, "notice and takedown" has become the unintentional
default regime for trademark claims (even though the DMCA only applies
to claims of copyright infringement) because copyright owners are
including claims of trademark infringement within the same notice to the
ISPs. 202 Particularly after the Second Circuit decision in eBay, platforms
are extremely reluctant to ignore the trademark claims, even where the
platform may believe the user had a good argument for noninfringement.2 03
Although some of the platforms themselves advocate for a DMCA-like
safe harbor and process, they caution that it is not as simple as replacing
the term "copyright" with "trademark." 204 Due to the differences between

communicative works, news reporting and news commentary, and where trademarks are
used in political speech).
202. See Etsy, et al., supra note 84, at 3. In fact, depending on the platform,
trademark claims may outnumber the copyright-related ones. See ETsY, 2014
14, 2015), https://blog.etsy.com/news/files/2015/07/
Report (Jul.
Transparency
Etsy TransparencyReport_2014.pdf.
203. See Etsy, et al., supra note 84, at 3 (discussing various examples of trademark
uses that are abusive due to the likelihood that the user had a good non-infringement
argument).
204. Id. at 5. Some commentators are also in favor of using the DMCA as a backdrop
for trademarks. See Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harborfor Trademark: Reevaluating
Secondary TrademarkLiability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 52122 (2009) (arguing for a trademark statute that would parallel the DMCA). Other
commentators argue for a somewhat modified system. For example, Frederick Mostert
and Martin Schwimmer argue for an "expedited dispute resolution process" that
combines the notice-and-takedown of the DMCA with due process akin to the current
UDRP system. Frederick W. Mostert & Martin B. Schwimmer, Notice and Takedown for
Trademarks, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 249, 271-80 (2011). It would appear, though, that
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the rights underlying copyright and trademark, we believe that a "notice
and takedown" system is too blunt of an instrument, as it lacks the ability
to take into account the nuanced analysis that is required of claims of
trademark infringement. 2 05 For example, while copyright law provides for
a relatively discrete examination of "substantial similarity," trademark law
requires consideration of many more factors beyond similarity, including
the marketing channels used, likelihood of "bridging the gap" between the
goods of the defendant and the plaintiff, the defendant's intent, and
evidence of actual confusion. 2 0 6 In the case of counterfeit merchandise, it
becomes extremely difficult to tell whether the merchandise is actually
fake or not.2 0 7 And deferring to the plaintiffs determination opens up a
host of potential problems that may facilitate abusive takedown requests,
without independent examination. 2 0 8 Therefore, we suggest that the
United States needs to adopt a "notice and notice" framework, borrowing
from Canada's recent adoption of such system in the copyright context. 2 09

&

many practitioners are in agreement with the ISPs that some type of solution is needed.
Jason R. Brege & Kelli A. Ovies, Taking Down Trademark Bullying: Sketching the
Contours of a Trademark Notice and Takedown Statute, 12 WAKE FOREST J. Bus.
INTELL. PROP. L. 391, 407 (2012).
205. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 473 (2016). See also Teague, supra note 50, at

488-89.
206. Teague, supra note 50, at 489.

207. Id.
208. This has been seen in the copyright context. One study of the notices filed with
Chilling Effects, renamed to Lumen (an online depository of DMCA notice-andtakedowns) noted a substantial number of notices from competitor to competitor, or from
a big business to a blogger or hobbyist. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient
Process or Chilling Effects - Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 651
(2006). More recent research led by Professor Urban sheds much-needed light into
takedown practices. In part two of her three part, ground-breaking empirical research,
Professor Urban shows that 70 percent of notices sent to social media sites contained
questionable underlying legal claims. See Jennifer M. Urban, et al, Takedown in Two
Worlds: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 483, 510 (2017). Although this
high number includes problematic take-down notices from one particular individual, even
without this individual's notices included in the sample, the percentage of problematic
notices were approximately 36 percent. See id For the full description of all three parts
of Professor Urban's study, see Jennifer M. Urban, et al., Notice and Takedown in
Everyday Practice (University of California, Berkeley, Public Law Research, Working
Paper), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2755628.
209. See Notice and Notice Regime, OFF. OF CONSUMER AFF. (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02920.html.
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Unlike a notice and takedown format, which requires an ISP to take
down the infringing content upon notice, a notice and notice framework
would only require the ISP to forward the notice to the alleged
infringer. 2 10 As one commentator argued, a notice-and-notice regime
places the emphasis where it should be: on the alleged primary wrongdoer,
and takes a more moderate approach to self-regulation by returning
"intermediaries to their natural role as middlemen," restoring the
responsibility to the courts for enforcement. 2 1' It also respects the privacy
and expressive freedoms of end users more effectively than in a notice and
takedown regime.212
In an ideal world, these notices from trademark owners would contain
allegations of infringement for only those uses that were not within one of
the categorical safe harbors as previously discussed. In such a world, then,
compliance with the notice-and-notice framework would provide the ISP
with immunity from secondary liability of its users' infringement. Even in
a less-than-ideal world, compliance with the notice-and-notice framework
provides more clarity surrounding procedures, even where the alleged
infringements are not valid.
There are still some persistent questions, however. First, however, is
the tricky question of who would qualify for the safe harbor and thereby
should comply with a notice-and-notice regime. The DMCA, like the
European Union E-Commerce Directive, categorizes ISPs into different
types, depending on the service they provide. The DMCA's four
categories are: (1) transitory digital network communications (the
traditional service that ISPs provide, as in access to the internet for users);
(2) system caching (this is where an ISP has made an automatic copy of a
user's material in order to enable it to transmit); (3) information residing
on systems or networks at direction of users (for example, where an ISP
stores material on its system, but unlike in category (2), the storage is at
the request of the user, and not an automatic technical process like
caching); and (4) information location tools (this refers to services
210. Teague, supra note 50, at 488.
211. Christina Angelopoulous & Stijn Smet, Notice-and-Fair-Balance:How to reach
a Compromise Between FundamentalRights in European Intermediary Liability, 8 J. of

Media L. 266, 295 (2016).
212. Id. It is worth noting that there is a difference in enforcement strategy between
counterfeiting and trademark infringement due to the fact that counterfeiters will often
simply ignore notices. The notice-and-notice proposal here does encompass these two
different types of infringement, although recognizing that there are other approaches to
handle pure counterfeiting. See, e.g., Frederick Mostert & Marin Schwimmer, Notice and
Trackdown, IP MAGAZINE, June 2011, at 18-19.
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provided by search engines).2 13

While it would be handy to pull in these categories from the DMCA
into our new framework, there would be a number of problems with such
wholesale importation. First, due to the nature of trademarks and ISPs, an
ISP's services could be categorized under more than one category. 2 14 For
example, an e-commerce platform could fall into both the system caching,
and potentially into the information location tool categories due to how
they provide their retail services. This is problematic because for each
category, the DMCA provides different conditions under which the ISP
must follow in order to qualify for the immunity. 215 More concerning is
that some categories, such as "information location tools" would be
overbroad, as it does not distinguish between the different services that
such ISPs offer, such as paid advertising services (like keyword ads) and
organic services (where the ISP is simply indexing websites based on the
natural searches and hits by users).2 16
One solution to these problems is to meld together the categories
provided by the DMCA and by the EU E-Commerce Directive, as
suggested by one commentator. Jordan Teague recommends that ISPs
should be categorized according to how they interact with trademarks. 2 17
Teague identifies three different ways in which ISPs interact with
trademarks: (a) where an ISP uses trademarks to identify products for sale
(including directing users to similar products); (b) hosting content that
contains trademarks; and (c) informational index trademark uses. 2 18
Teague then proposes that a trademark safe harbor framework would
categorize ISPs into the following non-mutually exclusive types: "(1)
information location tools; (2) advertising platforms; (3) online brokers;
and (4) passive hosts." 2 19 This melds together the concepts from the
DMCA and the EU E-Commerce, as it brings into the trademark context
the recognition that ISPs are often actively interacting with trademarks
(online brokers, advertising platforms) and sometimes they are passively
storing the information (passive hosts).
213. 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d).
214. Teague, supra note 50, at 486.
215. For example, 512(d) requires information location tools to comply with the
notice and takedown process, whereas 512(b) has a different set of requirements for

system caching services.
216. Teague, supra note 50, at 486.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 486-487.
219. Id. at 487.
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With the categories identified, we can turn our attention to the
procedures that would be undertaken by such ISPs in a notice-and-notice
framework. As briefly outlined above, the trademark notice-and-notice
system would be distinguished from the existing copyright notice-andtakedown one because the ISP would not be required to takedown any
material. Upon receipt of the notice, the ISP would simply forward onto
the user the notice it received from the trademark owner. It would be up to
the user to takedown any material that was claimed to be infringing. Thus,
the ISP would be immune from any secondary liability if it ended up that
the user was in fact infringing another's trademark.22 0
While this sounds fairly straightforward, the lessons from Canada's
of the notice-and-notice regime for copyright
implementation
infringement claims are helpful to heed. In particular, the potential for
abuse needs to be carefully considered. Canada's legislation requires a
number of items to be placed within the notice, but leaves it up to
regulation as to specific language or template to be used.2 2 1 Canada's
Minister of Canadian Heritage and Official Languages decided to allow
the implementation of the law without issuing any regulations. 2 2 2 In
addition, the legislation provides that the ISP can face statutory damages
of a minimum of CAN$5,000 (and up to $10,000) if they do not forward

220. Under the notice-and-takedown framework that is currently in place (and used
for both copyright and trademark infringement claims), ISPs are required to act as the de
facto judge to determine whether material is infringing or not. Due to the vague
secondary liability standards, ISPs have stated that they err on the side of caution,
oftentimes taking down material that they believe could have a plausible claim of noninfringement. See Etsy, et al., supra note 84, at 3-4. Another major shift in the noticeand-notice regime is that the ISPs would no longer need to serve as the de facto judge in
the infringement analysis, with the hope of lowering error costs, as well as costs to the
ISPs.
221. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c-41.25(2) ("(2) A notice of claimed
infringement shall be in writing in the form, if any, prescribed by regulation and shall(a)
state the claimant's name and address and any other particulars prescribed by regulation
that enable communication with the claimant; (b) identify the work or other subjectmatter to which the claimed infringement relates; (c) state the claimant's interest or right
with respect to the copyright in the work or other subject-matter; (d) specify the location
data for the electronic location to which the claimed infringement relates; (e) specify the
infringement that is claimed; (f) specify the date and time of the commission of the
claimed infringement; and (g) contain any other information that may be prescribed by
regulation.").
222. Michael Geist, Canada's Copyright Notice Fiasco: Why Industry Minister
James Moore Bears Some Responsibility, MICHAEL GEIST (Jan. 12, 2015)
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2015/01/canadas-copyright-notice-fiasco-industry-ministerjames-moore-bears-responsibility/.
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the notice to the alleged infringer. 223 The combination of these two items,
a lack of regulation and a statutory damages award, has led to subscribers
receiving abusive notices that claim they could be subject to a substantial
fine (some notices claimed that the subscriber could face a $150,000 fine)
and face suspension of their Internet accounts. 224 Both of these claims are
false, as Canadian law limits the statutory damages award for noncommercial infringers to C$5,000 and there is no such provision regarding
account suspension in the Canadian Copyright Act. 225 These abusive
notices have led some subscribers to pay the fines, as well to an overall
sense of confusion. 226
Any notice-and-notice regime adopted in trademark law should likely
include provisions regarding a form notice template with required
language.2 2 7 Serious thought needs to be given to drafting the form notice
template that uses clear, non-legalese language, as well as governmental
(or nonprofit) resources for the recipient of the notice to turn to with
questions or concerns.22 8 While the goal of a notice-and-notice system is
to take the platform out of the role of enforcing trademark owners' rights,
the pendulum should not swing so far to where users are left without any
223. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985 c-41.26(3). Although the law does not
specifically state this, it could be reasonably assumed that the statutory damage award

would be per instance. This would mean that for each notice that an ISP failed to forward,
the ISP could face a statutory damage award of between $5000 and $10,000. This could
quickly add up to an expensive proposition, as ISPs report that they have been receiving
thousands of notices each day. See Claire Brownell, Piratesin your neighbourhood:How
new online copyright infringement laws are affecting Canadiansone year later, FP TECH
DESK (Feb. 12, 2016 at 4:57 PM) http://business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/piratesin-your-neighbourhood-how-new-online-copyright-infringement-laws-are-affectingcanadians-one-year-later.
224. Michael Geist, Canadians face barrage of misleading copyright demands,
TORONTO STAR (Jan. 9, 2015) https://www.thestar.com/business/technews/2015/
01/09/canadiansface barrage of misleadingcopyright demands.html.
225. Id.
226. Nicole Bogart, No, you do not have to pay a 'settlementfee' ifyou get an illegal
download notice, GLOBAL NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017) http://globalnews.ca/news/3179760/noyou-do-not-have-to-pay-a-settlement-fee-if-you-get-an-illegal-download-notice/.
227. The ISPs in Canada are attempting to mitigate the lack of any required notice by
including a "wrapper" that indicates to the user that the enclosed notice is merely an
allegation of infringement, as well as directing the user to resources. Telephone Interview
with Martin Simard, Director, Copyright and Trade-mark Policy Directorate (June 3,
2017) (notes on file with authors).
228. See, e.g., Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Office of
Consumer Affairs, Notice and Notice Regime, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02920.html (last visited on July 23, 2017).
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protections. As we can learn from the Canada example, it is likely that
loopholes will exist in any legislation, even with well-thought out
statutory language. Any notice-and-notice legislation should take this into
account and build into the system a way in which regulations could be
easily implemented to cover any unforeseen loophole that has a negative
impact on users and the system as a whole.
We do note, however, that one of the major downsides to the above
proposals in Section A and B is that we are calling for legislative action.
And as seen in recent years, legislative changes, particularly where they
do not ratchet up protection for trademark owners, will be difficult to get
passed by the U.S. Congress. In addition, even if some of the proposed
changes are taken under consideration by Congress, there is still a lengthy
process before any changes would become effective. Some changes are
needed in the short term. Therefore, this next subsection explores some
common law changes that judges could undertake now through their
interpretation of the Lanham Act and prior case law.
C.

COMMON LAW CHANGES

Trademark scholarship and commentary is filled with suggestions as to
how to reform trademark law in order to take into account the concerns
facing trademark users. 2 2 9 The two suggestions we proffer here are (1)
requiring a materiality of harm and (2) clarifying the duty to police. These
two changes in the way judges approach trademark infringement cases can
go a long way in mitigating some of the negative externalities that the
platform architecture, as it intersects with trademark law, produces.
1.

MaterialityofHarm Requirement

Trademark infringement doctrine is a species of tort law. The wrongful
behavior is the infringement of a trademark. As with any tort, there needs
to be an injury to the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant. In current
trademark infringement cases, the injury caused by the defendant is the
229. For a small sampling of such work, see generally Graeme Dinwoodie,
Developing Defenses in TrademarkLaw, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 99 (2009) (arguing
for courts to adopt stronger affirmative trademark defenses); Gerhardt, supra note 47
(suggesting a consideration of consumer investment in brands); Mark A. Lemley & Mark
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REv. 413 (2010) (advocating that only
source confusion should be presumed material in trademark litigation cases); Ramsey,
supra note 190 (arguing that descriptive marks and slogans should be considered
unconstitutional); Alexandra J. Roberts, Tagmarks, 105 CAL. L. REv. 599 (2017)
(proposing a reconsideration of the registration of hashtags); Rebecca Tushnet, Running
the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. 1305 (2011) (proposing a materiality standard for trademark law).
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"likelihood of confusion" that the defendant's unauthorized use of their
trademark could cause. 230 This "likelihood of confusion" analysis involves
a multifactor test, which takes into account a number of different
variables, such as the differences in the marketing channels of the
plaintiffs and defendant's products, the type of product, etc. 231 Unlike
other types of torts, missing from the analysis is an examination of
whether defendant's use has, in fact, injured the plaintiff through a
reduction in sales of plaintiffs products because there was actual
confusion. Although actual confusion may be assessed as part of the
multifactor test, it is not required for a fact finder to determine that a
likelihood of confusion exists. 23 2 This is problematic because a
defendant's guilt rests on speculation of what consumers would think and
at no time is the plaintiff required to show what consumers have done in
response to defendant's use.
Mark McKenna has argued that a presumption of harm is not
warranted where a defendant's use of a mark is on goods that do not
compete with the plaintiff's.233 Additionally, Graeme Austin has argued

that, "as a legal policy matter, equating trademark rights with what
consumers might become confused about cannot be sufficient." 234
Rebecca Tushnet has long advocated for a return of a materiality element
in trademark infringement cases, similar to that found in false advertising
cases. She argues, "[r]egardless of what message consumers receive from
the words and images in an ad, a far more important issue is what
messages affect their decisions in identifiable ways." 235 This materiality
would look at "whether consumers care whether a particular use of a
trademark is made with the permission of the trademark owner. Often they
do not." 23 6

The practical implementation of this standard would be that the fact
finders in a trademark infringement case would need to answer the
question of whether a consumer would buy or perhaps pay more for a
230. See Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 302.
231. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23.19 (5th ed.).
232. Id.
233. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory ofHarm, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 63, 70-71 (2009).
234. Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion about Confusion: TrademarkPolicies
and FairUse, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 157, 175 (2008).
235. Tushnet, supra note 229, at 1344.
236. Id. at 1366 (emphasis in original).
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particular product based on a belief that the product was made by, or
affiliated, sponsored, or endorsed by, the trademark owner.23 7 If the
answer is no, then the defendant's use of a mark that is either the same or
similarly confusing to the plaintiff s is not material, and therefore, causing
no harm. The case would be resolved in favor of the defendant. And this
would still be true even if the defendant's use was likely to cause
confusion.
The reintroduction of a materiality element would go a long way to
rebalancing the relationship between the macrobrands and microbrands
because a good deal of online trademark infringement claims deal with
non-source-related confusion, such as sponsorship, affiliation or
endorsement (such as in keyword advertising). In such cases, Mark
Lemley and Mark McKenna advocate that where confusion is over the
source of the product, there should be presumed materiality (although a
rebuttable presumption), and other types of confusion should be
presumptively immaterial. 2 3 8 This would strictly limit the types of
actionable infringement claims that trademark owners could allege against
microbrands in their notices to macrobrands, which could result in a more
balanced relationship between the two. In the context of macro and
microbrands in the platform ecosystem, this solution seems particularly
appropriate to consider and employ.
2.

Clarificationof the "Duty to Police"

Although the Lanham Act does not explicitly require trademark
owners to "police" their marks, over a half-century's worth of court cases
does appear to place some type of burden on an owner to ward against
infringing uses of their trademark. 2 3 9 The specifics of this duty, however,
remain unclear.2 40 What is clear, though, is the perception by some
trademark owners that this "duty" requires them to pursue possible
infringers aggressively or else "lose their mark." 2 41 This perception is
237. Id at 1368.
238. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 229, at 445-46.
239. Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of
Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 224-26
(2014) (tracing the genesis of the duty to police).

240. Id.
241. For example, the president of Monster Cable has been quoted as saying, "We
have an obligation to protect our trademark; otherwise we'd lose it" as a rationale for the
company's trademark bullying. Benny Evangelista, Monster Fiercely Protects Its Name:
Cable Products Company Sues Those Who Use M-Word, S.F. GATE., Nov. 8, 2004,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Monster-fiercely-protects-its-name-Cable-
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fueled by judicial statements such as this one from a 2003 Federal Circuit
opinion, "Trademark law requires that the trademark owner police the
quality of the goods to which the mark is applied, on pain of losing the
mark entirely." 242 However, the actual loss of one's mark is extremely
rare 243 and is therefore not a valid reason for over-enforcement.
The real driver for aggressive enforcement is the reward, as well as a
lack of consequences for over-stepping the legal boundaries. Courts have
taken as probative evidence aggressive enforcement strategies as proxies
for a "strong" mark.24 4 As one of us has argued in previous works, this
aggressiveness can often cross the line into abusiveness where the parties
in the dispute are imbalanced. 245 It is easy for a mark owner to slide into
abusiveness, as trademark law lacks any mechanisms to hold trademark
bullies accountable. There are virtually no consequences for overenforcement. 246 But the rewards are great, as a strong or famous trademark
is granted a larger scope of protection. Trademark owners whose marks
are considered strong may bring infringement actions against defendants
using the same or similar marks on unrelated products. In addition, owners
of famous trademarks may bring dilution actions where defendants are
using marks that can be associated with the famous mark, but is not even
causing a likelihood of confusion. This enlarged scope of protection can
provide some trademark owners with the ability to claim almost complete
exclusivity over all uses of their marks. Given this lack of understanding
of the duty to police one's trademark, the potential rewards, and the lack
of consequences for over-enforcement, it is easy to understand aggressive
(and perhaps even abusive) enforcement in the online space where uses of
trademarks are ubiquitous.2 4 7 Trademarks appear everywhere online, from
blogs to reviews, to sales of used product listings. 248 An industry of
2675907.php. See also Jessica M. Kiser, Brands as Copyright, 61 VILL. L. REv. 45, 73
(2016) ("This duty to police serves as a justification for bully-like behavior by trademark
owners"); Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FoRDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (2012).
242. Nitro Leisure Prod., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
243. Kiser, supra note 241, at 73.
244. See id.
245. Grinvald, supra note 119, at 417-18.
246. Id.
247. In addition, Jessica Kiser's work in the emotional attachment to marks provides
additional grounds to understand why trademark owners would want to be aggressive in
their policing. See generally Kiser, supra note 241 at 73.
248. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and its Implicationsfor Trademark Law,
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"brand management" has arisen to help trademark owners police their
trademarks online, which gives owners the ability to note any use of their
mark.2 4 9 Unfortunately, while not every use of a trademark is infringing, it
may appear infringing to an over-zealous policer as long as it is
unauthorized.2 5 0 What this does is place trademark owners into overdrive
in sending cease-and-desist letters or including trademark claims within
take-down notices to platforms. As discussed above in Parts II and III, this
places not only a serious burden on the platform, but risks unbalancing the
ecosystem of the macrobrands and microbrands.
Related to this Article's suggested materiality requirement, but not
mutually exclusive, is the proposal that judges make concerted efforts to
clarify the "duty to police" one's trademark. A number of other
commentators have previously noted this clarification is needed.2 5 1 We
agree with these commentators and further argue that what is needed are
judicial pronouncements that would negate the effect of the Federal
Circuit's 2003 statement as quoted above (and others like it). 25 2 Ideally,
there would be leadership on this issue from one of the circuits active in
trademark law, such as the Second, Seventh, or Ninth Circuits. Consider,
as an example, this pronouncement from Thomas McCarthy:
The question is not how often or how assertively the trademark
owner has enforced its mark, but what has been the marketplace
loss of strength, if any, resulting from a failure to enforce. The
real question is public perception of plaintiffs mark, not a battle

in TRADEMARK LAW & THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 411-12
(Dinwoodie & Janis eds., 2008); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media Amplify Consumer
Investment in Trademarks, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1491, 1524-26 (2012).
249. See, e.g., CAPTERRA, Top Brand Management Software Products,
http://www.capterra.con/brand-management-software/ (last visited Jun. 7, 2017) (listing
104 different brand management software).
250. See Kiser, supra note 241 at 73.
251. See Xiyin Tang, Against Fair Use: The Case for a Genericness Defense in
Expressive Trademark Uses, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 2021, 2063 (2016); See Kiser, supra note
241, at 73.; Dogan, supra note 155, at 1319; Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion
Revisited: A Response to Vogel and Schachter, 14 CI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 217, 219
(2014); Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 873, 877-79 (2012); Deven R. Desai & Sandra L.
Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1789, 1791,
1834-12 (2007).
252. Nitro Leisure Prod., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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count of how often it has threatened to sue or in fact sued.253
As to McCarthy's argument that it is the public perception that matters
in these cases, courts must stop rewarding bad behavior. Instead of
accepting the fallacy that a lack of third party use automatically equates to
high levels of trademark strength or fame, as some trademark owners
argue, courts should require stronger evidence of such acquired
distinctiveness. Although surveys are notoriously problematic, 2 5 4 courts
should require plaintiffs who argue strength or fame to conduct a
consumer survey of how consumers view their trademark. Currently
surveys are not required, although there are indications that some judges
expect surveys, particularly from large trademark owners. 2 5 5 A consistent
application of this heightened level of evidence for claims of strength or
fame could go a long way in lowering the expectations of some trademark
owners for their "reward" in over-policing their marks.
Of course, the downside to relying on judges as vehicles of change is
that it is haphazard, as judicial change is reliant on good cases being
brought before a judge so inclined to interpret the Lanham Act and prior
case law the way we (and others) suggest that it could be interpreted.
However, incremental change does have an effect, and one influential case
can have enormous ripple effects, as we saw with the Second Circuit's
eBay case.
Another downside is that, as we have noted above, a good portion of
all trademark-related disputes occur outside of a courtroom and so there
will be many instances where the law does not directly reach. However, as
William Gallagher has shown in his qualitative empirical study of
intellectual property lawyers, these informal disputes are settled in the
"shadow of the law." 256 Therefore, even a handful of good cases that apply
a materiality of harm requirement or clarify what it means to adequately
police one's trademark will be helpful in guiding lawyers as they assist
their clients. Ideally these "good" cases would feed into lawyers' advice to
their clients to not bring claims of infringement that rest on trademark uses
outside the realm of core trademark concerns (i.e., source confusion).

253. 4 J. THOMAS

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 11:91 (5th ed.).
254. See id. § 15:42.
255. See id. § 32:195.
256. William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of
IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 453, 456 (2011).
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CONCLUSION

As suggested throughout this Article, at the same time that the absence
of law has facilitated the rise of platforms, there is now a growing need for
sophisticated legal systems to sustain the possibilities for platform
innovation and protection. This is particularly true of trademark law,
where the platform has both challenged established theories of
contributory liability at the same time that it has facilitated the need for
increased regulation.
This Article has argued that trademarks play a particular role in the
design and formation of nearly every aspect of a platform, producing two
central formations: macrobrands and microbrands. In turn, the formation
of these two systems, and the intersection between them, both challenge
and transform trademark law as a result, opening up new questions and
opportunities. In order to protect the vitality and innovation of the
platform ecosystem, trademark law must begin to reinvent itself in
addressing contributory liability. Rather than turning to copyright law and
the DMCA as an example of how to govern online infringement, this
Article instead argues for the employment of additional tools - a notice
and notice system, in particular - in order to restore intermediaries to their
original roles and limit the significant administrative costs associated with
enforcement. By considering both legislative reform and common law
adjustments, trademark law can facilitate an even greater level of growth
and innovation within the platform ecosystem.
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